Corporate deadlock constitutes a serious challenge in business governance, particularly in companies with a limited number of shareholders and in partnerships where equal ownership structures create impasses in decision-making. This article examines internationally recognized methods for resolving corporate deadlock, drawing on academic research and the legal frameworks of various jurisdictions. The study analyzes both contractual mechanisms (including mutual control clauses, buy-sell agreements, and casting vote arrangements) and alternative dispute resolution methods (mediation, arbitration, and hybrid approaches). The research demonstrates that the advance inclusion of deadlock resolution provisions in shareholders’ agreements significantly reduces litigation costs and ensures business continuity. The findings indicate that mutual control mechanisms, when properly designed with due consideration of information asymmetry and financial disparities, offer effective solutions, while mediation and arbitration provide flexible alternatives capable of preserving ongoing business relationships. This article contributes to the corporate governance literature by synthesizing empirical evidence on the effectiveness of deadlock resolution mechanisms and by offering practical recommendations for business owners, legal practitioners, and policymakers.